Amazing Loan Purchase, Restructure and Flip- all in less than a day.

What the below article doesn’t spell out is that the restructure seems to have been closed before the Option Purchase even closed. The Borrower signed four days prior. I am grateful to have contributed to this story.



REFI TV Roundtable: Commercial Real Estate and The Boiled Frog

Interview with NYREJ Radio

Click for Audio

How to merge yield hungry investors and CMBS workouts.

What we heard at the CREFC January Conference.

Earlier this month, representatives of the Real Estate Capital and Bond Markets assembled at the Commercial Real Estate Finance Council’s (CREFC) January Meeting in Miami, FL. Case Property Services was among those who attended and proudly sponsored a portion of this very informative and well planned event.

In addition to the great keynote Speech by Oakland Athletics General Manger Billy Beane, there were many panels that were not only informative but provided significant insight into the respective panelists industry and corporate mindset. For our clients, we tried to read between the lines to convey these insightful facts:

  1. RISK TAKING: “Risk on” was the consensus. The reasoning: comfort with risks and “hair on the deal” previously shunned, and “we are paid to make deals” so “we adapt to the market.”
  1. SPECIAL SERVICER CONTINUITY: In the past, the special servicer on a specific loan would change every once in a while. Now they can change twice in a month.
  1. SPECIAL SERVICERS AND CMBS BONDHOLDERS: Both agree that the process is flawed. They disagree though on much of the “how.”
  1. DISTRESSED DEBT RESOLUTIONS: More than ever, driven by realism, but lenders are protecting their downside through an effective use of clawbacks.
  1. SELF AWARENESS: CMBS lenders are very aware of the logistical issues involved in being a borrower of CMBS loans. Many are ignoring this matter, but some executives are working on keeping you as a customer.

What does this mean? Very simply, as a borrower or potential borrower, know what you need, know why you need it, and know why the lender should agree with your thought process- then explain it to them.

Should you have any questions, please feel free to reach out to us at (646) 412-5888.

There will be Blood: Why lenders are unleashing the floodgates.

Click to view the full article as published in the 11/26 New York Real Estate Journal.



You can view the .pdf version here.

New Print Ad

This is a nice advertisement we are putting in the NY Real Estate Journal (to be published at the ICSC NY Show) alongside an article about  CMBS note sales.


TreppLoan Client Spotlight: Case Property Services

Client SpotlightCase Property Services is honored to be featured by Trepp LLC in its Client Spotlight.

Trepp is an industry leader in providing CMBS and loan data /surveillance. Much of what CPS does on a daily basis goes hand in hand with on information provided by TreppLoan.

You can review the Client Spotlight here.







The Evolution of a Loan Modification, A white paper by CW Capital

The white paper can be accessed at

Please be advised that CW Capital makes no endorsement of the services provided or methods utilized by Case Property Services.


Rising Values are forcing special servicers hands, generating fees

Eliot Brown of the Wall Street Journal recently published a great article titled “Bad-Loan Revival Unburdens Banks” which articulated how the rising real estate values are allowing banks to dispose of REO assets without incurring much of a loss.

For the classic banking institution, there is no doubt that the rising values are a boon, but for CMBS Trusts beholden to complex rules, it serves more as a means to realize losses, and generate servicing fees- a forcing of their hand, if you will. To explain, I will need to run through a quick CMBS refresher course:

1. Advances:                             The CMBS structure allows for special servicers to lend money to CMBS trusts, as well as for the Trust to spend money on a loan or REO property (for specific purposes) so long as the investment can be recovered; this is based on the opinion of the servicer, which is formulated as a result of the due diligence it has conducted where the servicer lends money to the Trust (many times for the payment of interest to bondholders)

 2. Borrower  Negotiations:                    Many stories have been written regarding special servicers consistently denying borrowers’ proposals. For as long as I can remember, Morningstar’s CMBS  Research Reports have included a comment similar to “A denial by special servicers of borrower requests for loan extensions, modifications or debt restructuring, or a decision by borrowers to surrender the collateral, are still legitimate concerns.” The primary reasons behind this have been largely driven by the lenders’ opinion that the proposal set forth by the borrower may represent a lower Net Present Value than the alternative (foreclosure and REO sale, or Note Sale). In essence, the lender felt that a sale of the asset would net a greater return.

 3. CMBS Bond Stack:          As previously explained via the infographic posted on this Blog, the most subordinate bond tranche in the CMBS structure — also known as a “B-Piece” — and has a first loss position. In return for its risk, it is granted the title of “Controlling Class,” and has the unilateral right to appoint the special servicer and dictate strategy. This tranche usually is owned by hedge funds and special servicing companies. The tranches above it, progressively rated higher and more secure, are usually each owned by more conservative investors than the one beneath it. Once the lowest tranche realizes losses in excess of a certain percent (let’s say 75%) the control is passed to the bond class directly above it. In today’s market, many of the legacy CMBS trusts are one or two tranches away from being controlled by pension funds or insurance companies- if they aren’t already.

Over the past few years, it was in the best interest of the controlling class (not necessarily the Trust as a whole) to do everything possible to defer losses and have the special servicer collect fees (which it would then share with the controlling class ownership). As it would not be collecting interest distributions, and principal recovery was at a best a pipe dream, in many cases special servicers focused primarily on its fee income  as opposed to the interests of the trust as a whole. There, I said it.

Today, with rising values and  practical bond ownership, special servicers/controlling classes can for the most part no longer collect fees while just promising a better day, especially while making advances. The numbers just don’t work and there is way too much uncertainty. The inflation in property values, forces the special servicer to recommend a sale.

The good news? When a servicer sells a loan or property, they make a significant fee- a golden parachute .

The bad news? With the reality of a defined exit price and losses realized, perhaps the distressed borrowers offer was in fact the best net present value to the trust!